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Abstract 
Women's and men's use of care and justice considerations in 
response to moral dilemmas was investigated. Participants were 
63 men and 127 women ranging in age from 17 to 64. Each was 
presented with one of two dilemmas dealing with either 
abortion or drug use, as it affected either a daughter or a 
son, and asked to respond to the dilemma both in an open-ended 
format and in a Likert scale format. A Chi Square analysis was 
used to analyze the essay responses, which were categorized 
as primarily justice, primarily care, or both. The content of 
the dilemma was found to have a significant impact on the 
distribution of the responses (2 < • 01) • There were more 
justice considerations and fewer care considerations than 
expected by chance in response to the abortion dilemma, and 
more care responses and fewer justice responses than expected 
by chance in response to the drug dilemma. There was no effect 
for gender of either the respondent or the protagonist in the 
dilemma. Analysis of variance, used to analyze the Likert 
responses, revealed no effect for gender of the participant 
or gender of the protagonist, but those respondents who had 
a dilemma dealing with abortion used justice considerations 
significantly more often than did those whose dilemma dealt 
with drug use (2 < • 05). These findings are discussed in 
relation to the significance of abortion for Rhode Island 
residents. 
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-Moral Reasoning Related to 
Gender and Dilemma Content 
The intent of this research was to 
patterns of reasoning by women and men, 
investigate the 
and the role of 
dilemma content, in the use of justice and care orientations 
in response to moral dilemmas. 
Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982a), whose work has focused on 
gender differences in moral reasoning, has criticized other 
theories of moral development, most notably Kohlberg"s, for 
bias against women, as well as for the use of hypothetical 
moral dilemmas. She has pointed out that Kohlberg' s stage 
theory, as well as that of his predecessor, Piaget, was 
developed by studying only boys and men; no girls or women 
were included in their original research samples. Because of 
the exclusion of women and girls, Gilligan concluded that 
"developmental theory has not given adequate expression to the 
concerns and experience of women" (1977, p. 481). Gilligan 
argued that Kohlberg's theory, based on a morality of justice 
and rights, does not adequately capture women's experience, 
resulting in women frequently being scored at a stage below 
that of men. 
The observation that women tend to be scored lower than 
men, made both by Gilligan (1977, 1982a) and Kohlberg (1971), 
has since been addressed in a new scoring manual (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987). When the educational level and social class 
of women is controlled for, gender differences in stage level 
1 
are no longer found. Walker (1986), in an extensive review of 
empirical studies of gender differences in Kohlberg's stages, 
found that there really were no significant differences. 
Further, he found that the few studies that did find 
significant gender differences did not control for the 
educational level of their samples, and that the majority 
tended to use older versions of the scoring manual. While 
Walker's method of analysis was criticized by Baumrind ( 1986), 
his rejoinder (1986) addresses and refutes her concerns. When 
he recalculated his meta analysis utilizing her suggested 
statistic, he still found no evidence of an overall gender 
difference in stage level of moral reasoning using Kohlberg's 
schema. 
Gilligan has continued to focus on gender differences in 
her discussion of the inherent bias in Kohlberg's work (1977, 
1982a). After interviewing 29 pregnant women who were 
contemplating abortion, Gilligan and Belenky (1980) proposed 
that women proceed along a different, but equally valuable, 
path of moral development than do men. At the first level, 
women are said to be preoccupied with themselves and survival, 
viewing morality as simply obeying societal laws and 
restrictions. They then are said to proceed through a 
transitional phase from selfishness to responsibility. At this 
time, it is proposed that women become aware of the 
differences between what they want to do and what they feel 
they should do; their views become less egocentric. At this 
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second level, women are said to move to a sense of 
responsibility, equate goodness with self-sacrifice and caring 
for others, and become preoccupied with what others want or 
expect, excluding their own values and concerns from the 
decision making process. At the second transitional level, 
women are said to be again concerned with their own needs, and 
recognize in themselves a sense of inner judgment. At the 
third and highest level, women are said to be able to both 
assert their own individual rights and to give equal 
consideration to their responsibility to others. The main 
principle at this level is that of non-violence; the primary 
motive is to avoid hurt and to sustain relationships while 
still preserving personal values and rights. 
Gilligan has labeled the above process of moral 
development a morality of care, and that described by Kohlberg 
as a morality of justice. She views the morality of care as 
characteristic of the feminine voice and the moral imperative 
for women an "injunction to care". In contrast, in the 
morality of justice, the moral imperative is an "injunction 
to respect the rights of others and thus to protect from 
interference the right to life and self-fulfillment" (1977, 
p. 511). 
Gilligan has further claimed that the hypothetical 
dilemmas Kohlberg uses are useful for demonstrating objective 
principles of justice, but are inadequate for demonstrating 
the contextual principles of care and connectedness embedded 
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in women's thinking. She justifies talking to women 
contemplating abortion on the grounds that consideration of 
an abortion is a situation that places a woman in conflict 
with the cultural definition of femininity, and elicits 
concerns of selfishness and responsibility. She claims there 
exist "two different moral languages, the language of rights 
that protects separation and the language of responsibility 
that sustains connection" (1982b, p 210). 
Critics of Gilligan's theory have pointed out that it is 
derived from a small, non-representative sample of women, all 
of whom are in some sort of crisis. While Gilligan criticized 
Kohlberg for studying only men and boys in the development of 
his theory, she repeated the error by studying only women and 
girls in the development of her theory. She assumed that his 
theory was correct for boys and men, and developed her theory 
for girls and women without directly comparing the two 
genders. Further, there is little empirical evidence in 
Gilligan's original work which supports her claims. She does 
not provide us with her method of scoring the interviews, or 
with any empirical data directly comparing the use of justice 
or care considerations in her abortion sample. 
In response to some of these problems, Lyons ( 19 82) 
developed a coding scheme for rating responses to an open-
ended interview question that asks respondents to describe a 
situation, in which they were personally involved, when they 
did not know the moral or correct thing to do. Basing her work 
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on Gilligan"s (1977), Lyons delineated various aspects of the 
two moralities of justice and care, and derived a concise 
scheme for coding respondents' considerations of 
responsibilities (morality of care) and considerations of 
rights (morality of justice). (See Appendix A). Her scheme 
also allows for the examination of the construction, 
resolution, and evaluation of dilemmas. 
Lyons (1983) empirically tested Gilligan's hypothesis of 
the existence of two distinct moral orientations. 
Unfortunately, her sample was small (36), and ranged across 
a large age group. Consequently, she had only two men and two 
women at each of nine age groups. Using her own coding scheme 
to rate the responses, Lyons concluded that while the men and 
women in her sample used both care and justice considerations 
in their responses, the care orientation was used 
predominantly by women and the justice orientation was used 
predominantly by men. 
Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) conducted a similar 
investigation using Lyons' scoring procedures. The sample they 
used also had serious problems. They combined three smaller 
studies to arrive at a participant pool of 46 men and 34 
women. The participants in the smaller studies differed 
considerably in background variables such as social class and 
age, and ethnicity. One group was drawn from a sample of 
professionals, the second from first-year medical students at 
Northeastern universities, and the third from a coeducational 
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private school in 
majority of women 
the Midwest. Their study found that the 
and men used both care and justice 
considerations, but women tended to present a care focus and 
men a justice focus. A care or justice focus was defined by 
the use of one consideration at least 75% of the time in 
addressing a dilemma. 
The above two studies appear to provide support for 
gender differences in moral orientation, but their small 
sample sizes and wide age differentials have been questioned. 
Vasudev (1988) has pointed out that the moral dilemmas 
generated by the respondents represent a wide variety of moral 
issues, and that an individual's use of either a justice or 
care perspective is susceptible to the interviewer' s cues 
throughout the interview. 
The wide variety of dilemmas generated in the Lyons 
procedure is indeed a serious problem. While there is validity 
to Gilligan's claim that a hypothetical dilemma about an 
unknown other is a poor representation for a real-life choice, 
it is also necessary to consider the content of the dilemmas 
generated. The situation an individual considers could easily 
affect the type of response given. Gilligan herself admitted 
this when she pointed out that the Kohlberg "Heinz dilemma" 
tends to elicit a justice response while the abortion dilemma 
tends to elicit a care response (1977, 1982a). Kerber (1986) 
has criticized Gilligan's conclusion that moral orientation 
is related to gender for this very reason, arguing that: 
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It cannot be surprising that themes of responsibility and 
care emerge in women's articulation of their concerns 
about abortion. Gilligan alleges that the tendency to see 
"moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities" 
(1982a, p. 105) is a distinct characteristic of women's 
decision making, but conflicting responsibilities 
are necessarily embedded in a decision on abortion [and] 
the theme of care is equally present • • • The conclusions 
that Gilligan reports are implicit in the central 
question of the project itself (p. 304). 
Support for the need to consider the content of the 
dilemma can be found in a study by Bebeau and Brabeck (1987). 
They presented women and men dental students with four dramas 
based on an earlier study of "recurrent ethical problems in 
the practice of dentistry", and examined gender differences 
in the ethical sensitivity and moral reasoning of the 
respondents. They found no gender differences in moral 
reasoning, and principles of care and justice were used 
equally by women and men in their reasoning about a moral 
ideal. They also found that women were more likely to identify 
the ethical issues of a dilemma, that women attended to more 
patient characteristics and professional responsibilities, but 
did not attend differentially to issues of care. Women who 
were at the same educational level as their male counterparts 
did not give greater priority to issues of care. This study 
highlights the importance of using the same dilemmas when 
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comparing the responses of men and women. If different 
situations or aspects of situations are being used, it is 
difficult to compare responses. 
Rothbart, Hanley, and Albert (1986) examined the 
responses of 50 college students (25 women and 25 men) to an 
open-ended personal dilemma defined and described by the 
participant, the Kohlberg "Heinz dilemma", that deals with 
whether a man should steal medicine he cannot afford to save 
his wife's life, and an interpersonal dilemma dealing with the 
"issue of how a person makes decisions in matters of physical 
intimacy" (p. 648). They found that the moral orientations of 
both care and justice were widely used by both women and men. 
In fact, no one in their study used only one type of 
orientation. Responses were coded with a slightly modified 
version of Lyons' (1983) coding scheme. It was found that the 
Heinz dilemma elicited primarily justice responses from 76% 
of the participants; the interpersonal dilemma elicited 
primarily care responses from 78% of the participants; and the 
personal dilemma elicited primarily justice responses from 40% 
of the participants and primarily care responses from 56% of 
the participants; the remaining 4% of the participants did not 
show a clear preference for either care or justice 
considerations in response to the personal dilemma. When an 
overall analysis of variance was done, significant main 
effects were found only for the type of dilemma and not for 
the gender of the respondent, with no significant interaction 
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effect. 
Pratt, Golding, Hunter and Sampson ( 1988) provide further 
support for the hypothesis that dilemma content, not gender, 
is the mediating factor in the use of care or justice 
responses. They interviewed adults and analyzed responses to 
both Kohlberg's hypothetical dilemmas and to a personal 
dilemma generated by the respondent. They found no overall 
stage difference in men and women in response to the Kohlberg 
dilemmas, and gender differences in use of care and justice 
only for adults between the ages of 30 and 45. Additionally, 
no differences in use of care or justice considerations in 
the personal dilemma were found when the content of the 
dilemma was controlled. They classified the personal dilemmas 
as relational or non-relational, and found that all of the 
non-relational dilemmas elicited justice responses and that 
there were no gender differences in the relational dilemmas. 
The studies cited above all provide evidence contrary to 
the conclusions of Gilligan and Lyons, and suggest that there 
are no essential gender differences in moral reasoning. Any 
differences found in the analysis of responses to dilemmas 
appear to depend upon the content of the dilemma rather than 
on the gender of the respondent. 
Other mediating factors in moral responses may be the 
degree of difficulty the individual has in resolving the 
dilemma, and the importance of the dilemma. Ford and Lowery 
(1986) had 101 undergraduate women and 101 undergraduate men 
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describe three moral conflicts that they had personally 
experienced. Respondents were then asked to rate, on 7-point 
Likert scales, both the difficulty they had in resolving the 
conflict and the importance of the conflict to their lives at 
the time of its occurrence. Additionally, the participants 
were given a brief description of a care and a justice 
orientation and asked to rate, again on 7-point Likert scales, 
the degree to which each orientation was a part of their own 
thinking about each of the conflicts they described. 
Reliability coefficients calculated across dilemmas showed 
that men were more consistent in their use of a justice 
orientation than women, and that women were more consistent 
in their use of a care orientation than men. However, women 
consistently rated their dilemmas as more difficult and more 
important than men. When the effects of difficulty and 
importance were used as covariates, a multiple analysis of 
covariance (MANCOVA) found no significant gender differences 
in use of justice or care ratings. Additionally, a content 
analysis of the dilemmas showed that the contents of men's and 
women's dilemmas did not significantly differ in the extent 
to which they were embedded in contexts of care and justice. 
Ford and Lowery further point out that in order to "sort out 
the influence of the content of the dilemmas, and concentrate 
on the issue of identification of subject care or justice 
issues, it would seem necessary to present standardized 
dilemmas that are equated or balanced for the extent to which 
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the content is embedded in justice or care contexts" ( p. 7 82) • 
Friedman, Robinson, and Friedman (1987) also demonstrated 
that there are no reliable gender differences in the types of 
moral reasoning used by a sample of undergraduate women and 
men. They presented 47 men and 54 women undergraduates with 
three of Kohlberg's dilemmas and one dilemma adapted to match 
the Kohlberg dilemma model. After reading each dilemma, the 
participants were asked to rate, on 5-point Likert scales, 
the relative importance of six justice and six care items in 
their considerations. Additionally, the participants were 
asked to rank order the four most important of the twelve 
items. Each of the items had been previously validated with 
a separate sample as representing a care or justice 
perspective. Both women and men rated their use of justice 
considerations as slightly higher than their use of care 
considerations, but no significant gender differences were 
found. Additionally, men's and women's ratings of the relative 
importance of the twelve items were highly correlated, with 
coefficients ranging from .92 to .97 for the five points on 
the Likert scales. 
The research cited above suggests that the use of a care 
or justice orientation in moral reasoning is not 
differentially related to gender. More important is the type 
of dilemma being considered and, possibly, the relative 
perceived difficulty and importance of the dilemma. The 
relation between dilemma and moral orientation seems to hold 
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for both abstract hypothetical dilemmas and more personal 
real-life dilemmas. Previous research also suggests the 
importance of holding constant the type of dilemma being 
considered, and returning to a standardized format as opposed 
to the open-ended personal interview format preferred by 
Gilligan and her colleagues. Gilligan's work, however, has 
highlighted the need for realistic dilemmas to which 
respondents can personally relate. Research is needed with 
samples of a wide age range, using varied dilemmas and 
reliable scoring methods. 
The present study was designed to meet these requirements 
and to further investigate the effects of gender and dilemma 
content on moral reasoning. Women and men participants were 
presented with a standard dilemma dealing with either a 
contemplated abortion or drug use involving their hypothetical 
teenage daughter or son. Participants were asked to answer 
open-ended questions and then to answer questions on Likert 
type scales which assessed the use of care or justice 
considerations. The open-ended dilemma was coded according to 
a modified version of a coding scheme developed by Lyons 
( 1982), and the participants' essays were classified as either 
"care" or "justice" focused, or "care/justice" focused. The 
Likert type scale scores were summed to provide each person 
with a "care" and a "justice" score. Chi Square analysis and 
ANOVAs were used to analyze the data. 
It was hypothesized that if the content of the dilemma 
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was controlled for, there would be no significant gender 
differences in the moral reasoning of the respondents. 
Specifically, it was predicted that: (1) Women and men would 
not differ in their use of care or justice orientations in 
their open-ended discussions of either dilemma, and that (2) 
women and men would not differ in the relative importance they 
place on specific care and justice items for either dilemma; 
It was also hypothesized that care or justice considerations 
would be related to the content of the dilemma, regardless of 
respondent gender, and it was predicted that (3) a dilemma 
dealing with abortion would elicit more care orientations and 
responses from both men and women than a dilemma dealing with 
cocaine use, and that a cocaine use dilemma would elicit more 
justice orientation responses than an abortion dilemma. 
Finally, due to stereotypes in our society about the nature 
of boys and girls, it was predicted that dilemmas with a girl 
as the protagonist would elicit more care orientations and 
responses, and dilemmas with a boy as the protagonist would 
elicit more justice orientations and responses. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 127 women and 63 men volunteers, 
ranging in age from 17 to 64, with a mean age of 25.4. As can 
be seen in Table 1, seventy-eight participants (52 women and 
26 men) were adult students attending classes at the College 
of Continuing Education, (mean age = 34. 3) whose participation 
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made them eligible for a $30.00 drawing for dinner at a local 
restaurant. A larger group of 50 men and 89 women had signed 
consent forms and took home the materials, along with an 
addressed and stamped envelope, but only 78 usable packets 
were returned (a response rate of 56 percent). 
One hundred twelve participants (75 women and 37 men) 
were students attending an introductory psychology class at 
the University's main campus (mean age = 19. 3). These students 
received extra course credit for their participation. 
Participation of all respondents was completely voluntary, and 
participants were told that they could withdraw at any time. 
Table 1 
Participants' Mean Ages and Gender 
Number of Women 
Mean Age of Women 
Number of Men 
Mean Age of Men 
Total# Participants 
Mean Age of Sample 
CCE 
52 
35.8 
26 
31.2 
78 
34.3 
14 
Intro Psyc 
75 
18.8 
37 
20.3 
112 
19.3 
Total 
127 
25.4 
63 
24.8 
190 
25.4 
The participants were predominantly heterosexual (98%), 
Euro-American (96%), and of a middle-class background. Fifty-
nine percent identified themselves as Catholic, 9% as 
Protestant, 8% as Jewish, and 25% as another or no religion. 
Among the sample, 77% had never been married, 17% were married 
at the time of the study, and 5% were divorced; 86% had no 
children. 
Procedure 
Originally, the Continuing Education students were meant 
to be one sample, and the Introductory Psychology students a 
replication, with some slight differences in the instructions. 
Because these differences had no impact on the outcome (i.e., 
the dependent measures), the two samples have been combined. 
All interested students signed informed consent forms 
advising them that they would be asked to read and write about 
a sensitive and controversial dilemma, that their responses 
would be completely confidential, that their participation was 
voluntary, and that they could decide not to continue 
participating at any time. They were also given an opportunity 
to enclose their address on the consent form so the 
investigator could mail them a description of the study' s 
findings. 
After signing the informed consent, participants received 
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-one of four questionnaire packets containing: a demographic 
questionnaire; a hypothetical dilemma dealing with either drug 
use or abortion; open-ended questions dealing with responses 
to the dilemma; and questions to be answered on Likert scales. 
Four dilemmas were randomly distributed: an abortion or 
cocaine use involving either a son or a daughter. The 
respondents were asked whether they had ever been in a 
situation similar to the one described; and finally they were 
asked to rate on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 the ease they had 
imagining themselves in the dilemma described. The 
participants were asked to spend approximately 30 to 45 
minutes filling out the questionnaires in a quiet and private 
place and then to return them to the investigator either by 
mail (Continuing Education students) or in person 
(Introductory Psychology students). 
Stimulus Materials 
Instructions given to the Continuing Education students 
were as follows: 
People often confront dilemmas. A dilemma is a situation 
where you have many options and are unsure of the 
correct thing to do; some dilemmas are trivial and some 
are more significant. For example, if you see a classmate 
cheating on an exam, you may not be sure how to react. 
Please read the following scenario and pretend that you 
are in the situation described, then write what you would 
do in that situation and why. In your answer, please 
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describe the dilemma as you see it, how you will try to 
resolve the dilemma, and what you think will happen after 
your proposed resolution of the dilemma. 
One of the fallowing four scenarios fallowed the instructions. 
1. Your sixteen year old son has been dating a young woman for 
some time. She becomes pregnant and is contemplating an 
abortion. Your son asks you for advice and help. 
2. Your sixteen year old daughter has been dating a young man 
for some time. She becomes pregnant and is contemplating 
an abortion. Your daughter asks you for advice and help. 
3. You discover that your sixteen year old son has been using 
cocaine. You are contemplating whether or not to turn him 
over to the police. 
4. You discover that your sixteen year old daughter has been 
using cocaine. You are contemplating whether or not to 
turn her over to the police. 
For Introductory Psychology students, the definition of 
a dilemma and the example of cheating were presented as 
described above, but instead of asking participants to 
describe what they would do and why, and then listing what 
that answer would entail, the following specific questions 
were asked after the dilemma was presented: 
Would this be a dilemma for you? If so, please describe 
what the dilemma would be. What issues would you consider 
in making a decision? What would you do and why? (I am 
most interested in your thinking and your reasons, not 
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only in what you would do). How would you decide if you 
had made the right decision? 
After each question was space for the respondents to answer. 
Response Measures 
The main ideas of all the essays were coded as either 
care or justice by a trained undergraduate rater according to 
a modified version of a coding scheme developed by Lyons 
(1983), (Appendix A). Those essays where either a justice or 
a care consideration was used more than 75% of the time were 
categorized as either "justice" or "care-focused". Other 
essays were categorized as "both". 
Respondents were asked, following the presentation of 
the dilemma, "how important were the following items in your 
consideration of the dilemma?" For each of eight items, a 5-
point Likert scale was presented. This method was adapted from 
Friedman, Robinson, & Friedman (1987). A rating of 1 indicated 
little or no importance, 3 indicated moderate importance, and 
5 indicated high importance. Four of the items address care 
considerations (C items) and four address justice 
considerations (J items). Responses to the 4 care and the 4 
justice items were summed to give each respondent a numerical 
"care" and "justice" score. The items are as follows: 
1 (C). Consideration of the actual consequences for the people 
involved. 
2 (C). Consideration of the effects on my relationship with 
my child. 
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3 ( C) . Consideration of the particular situation and the 
characters of the all the people involved. 
(C). Consideration of the obligation to avoid hurting the 
people involved. 
5 ( J) • Consideration of whether or not there is a moral 
principle at stake. 
6 ( J) • Consideration that certain human rights are more 
fundamental than the law. 
7 (J). Consideration of the rights of all the people involved. 
8 (J). Consideration of the right of each individual to make 
an independent value decision. 
Other Measures 
The final page of the packet asked participants whether 
they had ever been personally involved in a situation similar 
to the one described, and if so to explain the circumstances 
briefly. The participants were also asked to rate on a scale 
of 1 to 5 how easy it was to imagine themselves in the 
situation described (l=very easy, 3=moderately difficult, and 
S=extremely difficult). 
Results 
No significant differences between the Continuing 
Education and Introductory Psychology participants were found 
on any measure, except for Ease of Imagination: Continuing 
Education Mean= 2.62, Introductory Psychology Mean= 3.22, 
p < .01, so their data were analyzed together. 
Open-Ended Questionnaire Analysis 
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Responses to the-open ended questionnaire were coded by 
a trained undergraduate rater who was unaware of the 
hypotheses and the gender of each respondent. Each main idea 
within the respondent's essay was categorized as either 
"justice" or "care", according to a modified version of the 
coding scheme developed by Lyons (1983). The number of 
considerations in each category was then added, and divided 
by the total number of considerations. Those who used either 
care or justice considerations for more than 75% of their 
considerations were classified as "Care" or "Justice"; those 
who used neither care nor justice for 75% of the total number 
of considerations were classified as "Care/Justice". 
In order to determine reliability, 10 percent of the 
questionnaires were also coded by the investigator, blind to 
the gender of the respondent. The calculated percent agreement 
for those 20 essays was 70%. 
Chi Square analyses were performed to test the 
relationships between the frequency of persons categorized as 
"Care", "Justice" or "Care/Justice" and ( 1) gender of the 
respondent, (2) the dilemma responded to, and (3) gender of 
the protagonist in the dilemma. 
As seen from the data presented in Table 2, gender was 
not a significant variable. There were no statistically 
significant differences between the observed and expected 
frequencies for men and women. The majority of women's and 
men's essays were classified as Care/Justice (56.9% and 63.3%, 
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respectively); Categorized as primarily care in orientation 
were 34 .1% of the women's essays and 25. 0% of the men's 
essays. Categorized as primarily justice in orientation were 
8.9% of the women's essays and 11.7% of the men's essays. 
Table 2 
Observed and Expected Frequencies of Care, Justice, and 
Care/Justice Responses by Women and Men 
Gender 
Type of Response Men Women 
CARE 
observed 15 42 
(expected) (18.7) (38.3) 
JUSTICE 
observed 7 11 
(expected) ( 5. 9) (12.1) 
CARE/JUSTICE 
observed 37 70 
(expected) (35.4) (72.6) 
Chi Square= 1.669; df = 2; 2 > .05. 
As can be seen in the data shown in Table 3, the content 
of the dilemma proved to be a significant variable, in a 
direction opposite to that predicted. The abortion dilemma 
elicited more justice and fewer care responses than expected, 
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and the drug dilemma elicited more care responses and fewer 
justice responses than expected. The majority of essays were 
classified as Care/Justice (58.7%). Categorized as care were 
22.0% of the essay responses to the abortion dilemma and 42.2% 
of the essay responses to the drug dilemma. Categorized as 
justice were 13. 0% of the essay responses to the abortion 
dilemma and 6.0% of the essay responses to the drug dilemma. 
Table 3 
Observed and Expected Frequencies of Care, Justice, and 
Care/Justice Responses to a Dilemma Dealing With Abortion or 
Drug Use 
Type of Response 
CARE 
observed 
(expected) 
JUSTICE 
observed 
(expected) 
CARE/JUSTICE 
observed 
(expected) 
Dilemma 
Abortion 
22 
(31. 1) 
13 
( 9. 8) 
65 
(59) 
Drug 
35 
(25.9) 
5 
( 8 • 2 ) 
43 
(49) 
Chi Square= 9.505; df = 2; 2 < .01. 
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Gender of the protagonist was not a significant variable, 
as can be seen from the data in Table 4. There were no 
significant differences between observed and expected 
frequencies of care, justice, or care/justice categories 
related to whether a daughter or son was the protagonist. 
Table 4 
Observed and Expected Frequencies of Care, Justice, and 
Care/Justice Responses for Dilemmas Involving Daughters or 
Sons 
Type of Response 
CARE 
observed 
(expected) 
JUSTICE 
observed 
(expected) 
CARE/JUSTICE 
observed 
(expected) 
Daughters 
27 
(28.7) 
9 
( 9) 
52 
(53.7) 
Gender 
Sons 
30 
(28.3) 
9 
( 9) 
56 
(54.3) 
Chi Square= .301; df = 2; E > .05 
Likert Scale Analysis 
Responses to the Likert scale items were summed to give 
each person a "Care" score and a "Justice" score. These scores 
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were analyzed by two separate 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAs using gender 
of participant, dilemma content, and gender of protagonist as 
independent variables, and scores on each type of response as 
dependent variables. Scores could range from a low of 4 to a 
high of 20. 
For the Care scores, no significant main effects or 
interactions were obtained. The Means and Standard Deviations 
are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Women's and Men's Mean Care Scores for an Abortion and 
Drug Dilemma Involving Daughters or Sons 
MEAN: 
SD: 
Respondent 
Women Men 
15.83 
3.12 
16.30 
2.45 
Dilemma 
Abortion Drug 
15.66 
2.75 
16 .40 
3.08 
Protagonist 
Daughters Sons 
15.71 
3.07 
16.88 
2.76 
For the Justice scores, there was a significant main 
effect for dilemma content K(l, 182) = 9.200, (p < .01). The 
Means and Standard Deviations are presented in Table 6. No 
other main effects or interactions were significant. 
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Table 6 
Women's and Men's Mean Justice Scores for an Abortion and 
Drug Dilemma Involving Daughters or Sons 
MEAN: 
SD: 
Respondent Dilemma 
Women Men Abortion Drug 
14.26 
3.49 
13.89 *14.85 
3.96 3.13 
*2 < • 01. 
13.26 
4.03 
Protagonist 
Daughters Sons 
14.17 
3.61 
14.11 
3.70 
Additional Analysis 
An additional 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was performed which 
investigated whether any of the independent variables (gender 
of participant, dilemma content, gender of protagonist) varied 
significantly with respect to the ease respondents had in 
imagining themselves in the situation described. There were 
no significant main effects or interactions. 
Responses to the question "have you ever been personally 
involved in a situation similar to that described?" varied 
considerably. Some individuals reported being influenced by 
the experiences of friends or family, by their religious 
background, or by personal experience. Due to the wide variety 
of responses, and differing interpretations of what personal 
involvement meant, no statistical analyses were conducted for 
this item. 
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Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to assess the use of care 
and justice considerations in response to standardized, but 
personal, dilemmas. Use of care and justice orientations were 
assessed in two ways. Responses to an open-ended dilemma were 
categorically coded, and care and justice scores were derived 
from responses to Likert scale items. 
The dilemmas used were a compromise between the 
traditional "hypothetical dilemma" and dilemmas provided by 
respondents. It was felt that use of a standardized dilemma 
was important, but that it had to be one in which the 
participants could become involved and picture themselves. 
The use of written responses instead of face-to-face 
interviews allowed the responses to be free from unintentional 
cues provided by the interviewer. While some of the richness 
of individual responses may have been lost, it was felt that 
concrete, written responses, free from cuing, would provide 
the cleanest sample of the person's preferred mode of 
response. 
On the basis of both the categorical and continuous 
measures, the content of the dilemma being considered was 
found to be a major variable in the use of care or justice 
moral considerations. The dilemma dealing with abortion 
elicited more "Justice" essays and fewer "Care" essays than 
expected by chance, and respondents reported that the justice 
considerations weighed more heavily in their consideration of 
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the abortion dilemma than the drug dilemma. The dilemma 
dealing with drug use elicited more "Care" and fewer "Justice" 
essays than expected by chance. 
While these results support the hypothesis that the 
content of the dilemma is important in determining the use of 
care and justice responses, they are opposite in direction to 
the original prediction. It was predicted that the drug 
dilemma would elicit more justice concerns, and the abortion 
dilemma more care concerns. That the opposite was found in 
this particular sample of respondents may well be due to the 
high number of Catholic participants in the study. Many who 
responded to that dilemma said that abortion is morally wrong, 
a judgment classified as justice. Often these respondents 
expressed beliefs that the contextual factors were secondary 
to the morality of abortion, and that regardless of what their 
child wanted to do, they, as parents, would not permit an 
abortion. Additionally, often those who were in favor of 
abortion as a choice still approached the essay with a justice 
perspective. They discussed the importance of choice and 
legalized abortion and not the specific context of the 
dilemma. 
Feelings about the morality of abortion were expressed 
clearly even among a young college sample, who might be 
expected to be the most liberal in their views. Interestingly, 
these results differ from those of Gilligan and Belenky (1980) 
where the topic of abortion triggered Care responses. In that 
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work, the women were contemplating abortion for themselves, 
while in the present study, the abortion was for a 
hypothetical teenager. Perhaps when an individual is 
personally involved in a situation her or his reasoning 
differs from when he or she contemplates a hypothetical 
dilemma. 
The present results relevant to an abortion dilemma are 
particularly interesting in comparison to the responses to the 
drug dilemma. Cocaine use is clearly harmful and illegal, yet 
respondents were much more likely to take situational 
variables such as the age of the teenager, previous drug use, 
and the teenager's "personality" into account before making 
a decision. Such considerations may reflect the situations of 
the respondents. Drug use on a college campus is fairly 
common, and may not seem as problematic or as much a moral 
issue as an unwanted pregnancy. 
No gender differences in the use of care and justice 
considerations were found, as predicted. This result contrasts 
with Gilligan's and others' proposition that women are more 
likely to use "Care" and men are more likely to use "Justice". 
In fact, for both women and men, the most likely choice was 
a blend of both care and justice considerations (55.3% of all 
essays were classified as Care/Justice). Additionally, the 
mean care scores were higher for men, while the mean justice 
scores were higher for women. While the differences were not 
significant, the direction of the means further questions 
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Gilligan's proposition. Neither gender was more likely than 
the other to use a particular form of consideration in dealing 
with either the abortion or drug dilemma. 
There were no significant differences between women and 
men participants in the relative ease they had in imagining 
themselves in the situation presented to them. Most 
participants found imagining themselves in the scene to be 
"moderately easy". It is significant to note that while the 
majority of respondents were not married (77%) and did not 
have children ( 86%), they still reported not having much 
difficulty imagining themselves in the situation described. 
Perhaps this is due to the participants being on a college 
campus, where both drug use and abortion are not uncommon. 
This finding lends further support to the idea that an 
individual's background and the content of the dilemma are 
significant factors in the individual's response to that 
dilemma. 
There were also no differences in the use of care and 
justice orientations and responses when the dilemma involved 
a daughter or a son. It had been expected that dilemmas 
involving a hypothetical daughter would evoke more care 
responses than one involving a son; however, the gender of the 
protagonist was not a significant variable. 
It is of interest to note that a "Care focused" response 
was more common than a "Justice focused" response for all of 
the dilemmas; 29. 5% of all essays were classified as "Care 
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focused" as compared with only 9. 5% classified as "Justice 
focused". It is likely that care values were triggered because 
respondents were asked to imagine themselves in the situation, 
and because the dilemmas concerned a hypothetical teenaged 
child. In such dilemmas, it is likely that caring, 
responsibility, and attempts to understand the context of the 
situation would take priority over specific moral rules, 
obligations, rights, and absolute principles. However, it is 
crucial to keep in mind that the vast majority of respondents 
used both care and justice considerations when evaluating each 
of the moral dilemmas utilized in this study. 
One of the drawbacks of the present study is the 
participants were all relatively young college students. While 
some diversity in age was achieved via the Continuing 
Education students, it is important to replicate this study 
with a truly random sample of the population. Additionally, 
many of the participants were not parents; because of their 
minority, I was unable to compare the responses of those who 
did and did not have children. It is possible that a 
respondents' views about a hypothetical situation involving 
a teenaged child would change once that person had children. 
Conclusions 
The results of this study support the hypothesis that the 
content of the dilemma being considered is important in 
influencing the responses to it. Additionally, they highlight 
the fact that the gender of the participant is not related to 
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the preferred mode of response. 
The results further suggest that an individual's 
background and upbringing will influence her or his use of 
care or justice considerations. For example, fundamental 
beliefs in the morality or immorality of abortion appeared to 
outweigh the effects of gender. It is reasonable to assume 
that the content of the dilemma under consideration interacts 
with individual's personal experiences, attitudes, and 
beliefs, and influences her or his reasoning about the 
dilemma. 
Future research should investigate other dilemmas and 
contexts which might more clearly elicit care and justice 
orientations. Additionally, researchers should examine factors 
other than gender of the participant. Factors suggested by the 
present study are religion and ethnicity, or the extent to 
which a particular dilemma taps certain moral principles 
judged by the respondent to be unassailable and constant. It 
is essential to pay attention to the situational cues the 
dilemma provides to the respondents. Additionally, it would 
be worthwhile to compare an individual's preferred mode of 
response to other attitudinal and belief measures which might 
be related to the content of the dilemma being considered. 
It is also important to consider that people may approach 
a moral dilemma from a perspective other than care or justice. 
For example, people may conduct a cost benefit analysis of the 
situation in order to aid their decision making. Another 
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possibility is consideration of utility; in other words, an 
individual might do whatever would be most beneficial to the 
largest group of people, or whatever serves her or his own 
self interests. Yet another possibility is an emotional 
response - a response based on whatever "feels right" at that 
given moment. Certainly some people act on "instinct" or on 
a gut reaction in at least some situations. 
What is important to recognize is that any dichotomy 
considers only two possible perspectives, in this case, care 
versus justice. There are certainly other realms of moral 
reasoning which should be considered. Exploratory research 
should be done to look for other approaches to moral dilemmas, 
both in response to hypothetical and participant-generated 
situations. 
While there were no gender differences in preferred mode 
of moral reasoning, there are very real gender differences in 
the allocation of resources and power in our society. It would 
be useful for researchers to shift their focus from the gender 
of the respondent to other situational variables such as 
power, resources and income. Perhaps those individuals with 
more power in a given situation are more inclined to use 
justice considerations than care considerations, while those 
with less power would be more inclined to use care 
considerations. It would make sense that a relatively 
powerless individual would need to be more in tune with the 
contextual cues of a situation; that person may need to pay 
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attention to individual circumstances and the costs and 
benefits of a situation rather than to any specific moral 
principles. 
The line of research represented by this study is 
particularly important because it questions assumptions about 
the ways in which people think and behave. From a very early 
age members of this society are taught that women are "care 
oriented" and men are "justice oriented". Because we are 
taught to view the world through a gendered lens, we often see 
only what we expect to see. That is, when we view men or women 
acting in ways inconsistent with our perspective, that 
information tends to be forgotten or lost. Too often the 
"fact" that women are more caring and nurturing than men is 
used as a justification for denying women access to high 
paying and high powered jobs. Similarly, men are often 
excluded from child-rearing and caretaking because "it's not 
in their nature". Empirical research should question and test 
our assumptions about human behavior, particularly when the 
consequences of our assumptions and stereotypes are so 
devastating. 
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Appendix A 
Morality as Care and Morality as Justice: A Scheme for Coding 
Considerations of Response and Considerations of Rights 
I The construction of the Problem 
A. Considerations of Response (Care) 
1. General effects to others (unelaborated) 
2. Maintenance or restoration of relationships; or 
response to another considering interdependence 
3. Welfare/well-being of another or the avoidance of 
conflict; or, the alleviation of another's 
burden/hurt/suffering (physical or psychological) 
4. Considers the "situation vs.Jover the principle" 
5. Considers care of self; care of self vs. care of 
others 
B. Considerations of Rights (Justice) 
1. General effects to the self (unelaborated including 
"trouble" "how decides") 
2. Obligations, duty or commitments 
3. Standards, rules or principles for self or society; 
or considers fairness, that is, how one would like 
to be treated if in other's place 
4. Considers the "principle vs.Jover the situation" 
5. Considers that others have their own contexts 
II. The Resolution of the Problem/Conflict 
[same as part I] 
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III. The Evaluation of the Resolution 
A. Considerations of Response (Care) 
1. What happened/how worked out 
2. Whether relationships maintained/restored 
B. Consideration of Rights (Justice) 
1. How decided/thought about/justified 
2. Whether values/standards/principles maintained 
c 1981 by Nona Lyons 
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